



## Russian Federation Position Paper

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### Background Information on Russian Federation



Russian Federation (“the Federation”), the largest and yet the most influential Member State in the Asian region, has been a nation that’s best known by its rapid and harsh alterations of government structure and prolonged tensions between peoples from different political ideologies since the early roots of the nation, starting from the 10th century by the adoption of Orthodox Christianity under the rule of Prince Vladimir the Great. Although it’s imperative to note that the Indo-European, Ural-Altaic, and other diverse peoples have been living in the area that is now ruled by the Russian government, it’s also crucial to take into account the time period where the first tensions amongst inhabitants of this region have started, which not only sparked the perpetual tension in the region but, further, caused catastrophic destructiveness: the Mongol invasion of the Kiev region, starting from the calamitous defeat of the Volhynian-Galician- Polovtsian army on the Kalka River in 1223. With the help of Tatars, the Empire of the Golden Horde was formed, being the communal trade center of the region.

However, this stance was not to last for a long period; with the eagerness of Muscovite princes trying to re-acquire the Russian dominance in the region, Ivan III the Great started establishing voluntary allegiances of princes, which would further trigger the election of Michael Romanov in 1613, ending the foreign occupance whilst starting the rule of the Romanovs until the 1917 revolution, which would be the starting point of the new Russia that will later be called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Through a period of expansion of borders, Russian Empire conquered many places such as Crimea, the Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, and Moldova whilst preserving their main goal that would later be the primary reason of Russia’s engagement in World War I: the Russian desire to gain access to warm waters. Due to the poor conditions the people of Russia has suffered from because of the tragic effects of WWI, the people rose against the central government with a communist ideology, forming two main divisions amongst the Social-Democratic Workers’ Party: the Mensheviks—meaning “one of the minority”—and Bolsheviks, “one of the majority”. The Bolsheviks, led by Vladimir Lenin, supported a more aggressive, radical, and elitist revolution; the Mensheviks, led by Julius Martov, backed a more progressive change in accordance with the middle class and the bourgeoisie. The solemn—and, somewhat brutal—rule of Joseph Stalin, with his attempts to strengthen communism via increasing Russian nationalism, caused the USSR to expand its borders even more, reaching more into the European continent. After Stalin’s rule, the Soviet economy and society remained stagnant until General-Secretary of Communist Party, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, took the office of Presidency in 15 March 1990, attempting to modernize communism through the



introduction of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring). However, his actions led to the dissolution of the USSR, leaving Russian Federation and 14 other independent states behind.

Under the rule of President Vladimir Putin, the Russian Federation shifted toward a more centralized state, promoting populist appeals and a patriotic foreign policy focused on increasing the geopolitical influence of the nation. The Federation, at status quo, “faces a largely subdued rebel movement in Chechnya and some other surrounding regions, although violence still occurs throughout the North Caucasus” (“The World”).

## II/ Past Achievements and Attempts of Russian Federation on the Issues

**A. The Question of the Caucasus:** This portion of the position paper will be addressing the issue as two separate micro conflicts in regards to geographical differentiation, starting from the insurgency in the North Caucasus: bearing in mind that the insurgency takes place in 5 different republics (or federal subjects), it would be accurate to note that one of the most active regions is the Chechen Republic, where socio- and ethno political upheaval is still prevalent. Exploring the early roots of the issue, one can notice that the conflict is a result of the propagating religious and ethnic tensions between Islamist separatists that advocate for independence from the Russian Federation using the warrantless shibboleth of self-determination, and the Russian forces, trying to preserve their national borders whilst also ensuring the safety of their citizens residing within the North Caucasus. These two forces' first (physical) clash happened during the first Chechen war, taking place between 1994 and 1996, which resulted in an excessive number of casualties on both Russian federal forces and Chechen guerillas. After this vicious encounter, the Federation granted Chechnya *de facto* independence as per the terms of the Khasavyurt Accord, signed on 30 August 1996. Left with a poor infrastructure and corrupt regional government, the region permitted radical Islamist factions to form, turning the region into a criminal enterprise, where incidents such as kidnappings in pursuit of claiming ransom were not only oft-seen but were also seen as part of the regular routine. After the armed incursion led by the Chechen warlord, Shamil Basayev, the Federation—in an attempt to ensure the safety of the region and the suppression of such radical groups—invaded the region once again, resulting in a second Chechen War (August–April 2009). Followed by a series of fuelled air explosives and land war, in May 2000, the Federation's president, Vladimir Putin, established direct rule, appointing—the following month—Akhmad Kadyrov as the interim head. Galvanizing the public into an approval of the aforementioned action, on 23 March 2003, a new Chechen constitution passed after a referendum, giving the Chechen Republic significant autonomy, and although the Federation and a significant number of Chechen people supported the referendum and the passage of the new constitution, Chechen extremists boycotted it, claiming that it still gave the Federation too much power as to its jurisdiction, which ultimately led to the assassination of Mr.



Kadyrov in 2004. After the said assassination, Ahkmad Kadyrov's son, Mr. Ramzan Kadyrov—leader of a pro-Moscow militia— assumed the office of *de facto* head, ultimately replacing—after a decree signed by President Putin—President Alu Alhanov in February 2007 as the *de jure* president of the Chechen Republic. President Kadyrov, with the unanimous consent of the Chechen Parliament, changed his title of President to the Head of the Chechen Republic, claiming that there should only be one president in the entire Federation. Being the most conservative and populous federal subject in the North Caucasus, the primary reason for the political & military unrest in Dagestan revolves around the practice of, and the series of attempts to enforce, a syncretic form of Islam, Sufism and a more conservative conveyance of Sufism, Salafism, that advocates against secular rule. It's important to note that the unrest in Dagestan is connected with the Chechen Republic and another republic that'll be hereinafter mentioned, Ingushetia, given the history of these three states: During the Soviet era, these three nations declared independence from the Federation and formed a single state called "United Mountain Dwellers of the North Caucasus", which would later be dismantled due to the industrialization movements initiated by Joseph Stalin. That being said, the first tension in the recent history in this region started, in 1999, with a Chechen Islamist group—led by Shamil Basayev and Ibn Al-Khattab—called Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB) launching a military invasion to Dagestan in attempt to create an independent Islamic State of Dagestan. The groups actions resulted in Russian invasion of the region, which further triggered the Second Chechen War. It is still possible—and probable—to see civil unrest instigated by various rebel groups, though local support to such groups seem to deteriorate, given that they are deemed as “religious extremists” by the locals. Moving to another federal subject, Ingushetia, it is, again, important to note that the insurgency in this area was also triggered by, and connected to, the seperalist conflicts in the Chechen Republic. While the exact political definition of the incident that took place in Ingushetia remains a controversy—some categorizing it as a civil war, others claiming that it's an uprising—it's crucial to understand that the issue mainly revolved around the assasination of public office holders and media personnel, which led former President Murat Zyazikov to be replaced with Mr. Yunus-bek Yevkurov as per a decree issued by (Russian) President Medvedev, which was hailed as a victory for the Ingush people. In 2014, the insurgency's leader, Arthur Getagazhev, was killed by security forces; the issue seems to be eliminated, where there are almost no current casualties. Russian Federation mainly tackled the insurgency in Kabardino-Balkaria by neutralizing the leaders of rebel groups—Alim Zankishiev, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and Zalim Shebzukhov to name a few. Being the least active region amongst the ones listed above, President Medvedev vowed to the public after a bombing of a local market in North Ossetia-Alania, proclaiming, “We will certainly do everything to catch these monsters, who have committed a terrorist attack against ordinary people” (Schwartz). There is no additional piece of information



disclosed to the general public at this point regarding the (even the existence of) operations within North Ossetia-Alania region. Moving on to the conflict in the South Caucasus, it is, first and foremost, necessary to understand that the conflict in this area is merely about rebel groups or insurgency-esque vicious attacks, but more of a diplomatic conflict in regards to ethnic territorial disputes, catalyzed by various types of attacks from both sides. Exploring the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict—a conflict that was initiated back in the Soviet era—Mr. Joseph Stalin veered making Nagorno-Karabakh an autonomous oblast—id est: “smaller” autonomous nations within a federal subject— in Soviet Azerbaijan. The present conflict mainly started in 1988 when Karabakh Armenians demanded— and petitioned the Soviet government—for the nation to be transferred to Soviet Armenia. As the dissolution of the USSR ensued, the conflict enkindled, resulting in the Nagorno-Karabakh War, which ended with a Russian-mediated ceasefire, signed in May 1994. The Federation, in its attempts to further contribute to the termination of the conflict, issued a statement, condemning both sides of the conflict for their unscrupulous behavior in 2014, after Azerbaijani authorities reported that there were casualties within the Azerbaijani army because of a clash that took place near the Nagorno-Karabakh border. The Federation, at status quo, provides military support to both sides in an attempt to further protect all sides of the conflict from future possible casualties. Russian Federation’s main modus operandi in attempting to solve the conflict in South Ossetia encompasses various different political and military measures. Not only did the Federation initiated a peaceful control mission over a portion of the Republic of Georgia during the Russo-Georgian War in an attempt to enforce peace in response to the Georgian aggression against the existence of South Ossetia, but it also granted citizenship to many South Ossetian residents subsequent to the conflict to ensure a smooth transition of such displaced persons. On 25 August 2008, the Federation’s State Duma—lower house of the Federal Assembly—passed resolutions calling President Medvedev to recognize South Ossetia as an independent state, whereby President Medvedev issued a decree doing so, citing the UN Charter, and proclaiming: “This is not an easy choice to make, but it represents the only possibility to save human lives” (“Statement”). To briefly mention the last conflicted region under this agenda item, the conflict in the Republic of Abkhazia also goes back to the Soviet era, where the region was granted an oblast status under the Soviet Georgia. During the Abkhaz war (1992-1993), the Federation helped to preserve the national border of the Republic of Abkhazia against the Georgian forces, bilaterally recognizing Abkhazia as an independent state with the aforementioned decree issued by President Medvedev, whereas also still issuing passports to Abkhazian nationals since their passports cannot be used for international travel.



**B. The Question of the Caspian Sea and Surrounding Territories:** The issue of the Caspian Sea (“the Caspian”), at status quo, is a diplomatic one—one that has been tackled by the Russian Federation—and the USSR—in international platforms on various occasions. However before the Federation gained a diplomatic platform, it is crucial to mention the (1926-28) Russo-Persian War, which ended with the Treaty of Turkmenchay. This treaty, under its 8th Article (in addition to the Treaty of Gulistan—signed between Persia and Imperial Russia), states that Persian ships lost their right to navigate through the Caspian Sea. Being the first treaty that limits access to the Caspian (given that the Treaty of Resht of 1729 did not put a limitation as to the access to the Sea between Persia and Imperial Russia), it is followed by the Russo-Persian Treaty of Friendship (1921); once again affirming the USSR’s desire to keep in touch with international forces, this treaty gave equal level of access to the USSR and the Persian forces, whereby canceling all the agreements made with the Treaty of Turkmenchay, giving more power to the Persian government as to its access to the Caspian. It was further followed by the Treaty of Establishment, Commerce and Navigation (1935), which reaffirmed the previous 1921 treaty, however, further giving both the Iranian and Soviet government the right to fish within 10 nautical miles of their respective coastlines. Then came the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 25 March 1940, extending the 10-nautical mile fishing limit for Russian and Persian commercial vessels. The USSR further signed the Convention on the Continental Shelf in 1960 in an attempt to dissolve the confusion as to what a continental shelf was and whether to use the geographical definition in international diplomacy. After the dissolution of the USSR, the Federation signed various treaties with other Member States as well, mainly on the delimitation of seabeds—these treaties were signed between the Russian Federation and the governments of the Republic of Kazakhstan (1998), Azerbaijan (2002), whereas the Federation also signed treaties to protect the wellbeing of the Caspian, namely the Aktau Protocol—a treaty that tackles the issue of pollution. These regional treaties signed between the Federation and members of the “Caspian Five” were further finalized with the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, where the Federation extended the provisions granted to the Islamic Republic of Iran as per the terms of the 1921 and 1940 Treaties to all members of the “Caspian Five,” whereas also further commenting on how the resources gathered from the Caspian should be divided: The surface water of the Caspian is, under articles I and II, open to the common usage of the “Caspian Five,” where their commercial vessels can carry respective national flags; the 10-nautical-mile restriction for fishing is, with Article IX of this Convention, still valid; the Articles IV and VII ensure that any 5 Member State can take any action they wish in regards to the seabeds within their territorial districts, given that every state is following the principles of “mutual respect, cooperation and non-interference into the internal affairs of each other” defined under Article III (“Convention”).



**C. The Question of the Shift of Trade routes in Eurasia:** Since the New Silk Road Initiative (“Initiative”) was introduced by the Paramount Leader of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Mr. Xi Jinping, in 2013, it has been the primary factor that shapes Chinese–Russian economic, trade, and political relations. The Federation, at status quo, sees the project as a way of strengthening the trade bonds between the two nations whilst also fortifying the power and dominance of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and creating a strong Eurasian front against neo-colonist western powers. The Federation is mainly involved in building and preparing infrastructure for two projects under the overland portion of the new Initiative: The New Eurasian Land Bridge, which is to run from Western China to Western Russia via Kazakhstan, and The China-Mongolia-Russia Corridor, which is to start from Northern China and end at the Far East of Russia. To fund the latter, the Federation established a joint fund with the Chinese government in 2012 called Sino-Russian Investment Fund with the help of the governmental agencies of Russian Direct Investment Fund and China Investment Corporation. The Federation and the Chinese government recently bilaterally agreed to work on a maritime road project as well (as a part of the Maritime Silk Road) called “Ice Silk Road,” along the Northern Sea Route—a route that has been officially defined by the Russian legislative branch in 2013. As of July 2019, the Russian portion of the China-Western Europe transport corridor is under active development, and it is to become a 2,000km toll road from the Sagarchin crossing point with Kazakhstan to the border of Belarus (Shepard). President Vladimir Putin further dubbed the current Chinese–Russian relations as “the best they have been in their entire history” in Belt and Road forum that was held in Beijing between 25-27 April 2019, whereas also stressing the need for “eliminat[ing] infrastructure restrictions for integration mainly by creating a system of modern and well-connected transport corridors” and affirmed the continued Russian support by saying, “Russia with its unique geographic location is willing to engage in this joint activity” (Dasgupta). It is, ergo, clear that the Federation sees this Initiative achievable only if the support of the surrounding Eurasian Member States are gathered and that they are willing to join in this Initiative, thereby ensuring that the Federation will not be supporting the perpetuation of a trade monopoly imposed by one specific Member State on others (similar to those policies imposed on Asian Member States by Western powers), further criticizing the previously-used Chinese rhetoric, where it was implied that China, solely itself, will be owning and carrying out the Initiative altogether (id est: the oft-used emphasis on the word “one” when referring to the Initiative with its outdated name: “One Belt, One Road”).

### III/ Objectives, Aims and Possible Solutions Proposed by Russian Federation on the Issues

**A. The question of the Caucasus:** The question of the Caucasus is an intricate one—one that involves a wide range of geocultural elements, ethnopolitical conflicts, and, perhaps more importantly, extremist groups. If one were to list the most important and urgent precaution that’s needed to solve



the conflict in the North Caucasus, it must be the forced dismantling of religious extremist groups, the Caucasus Emirate (“the Emirate”) to name the most pivotal in terms of the damage it gives to the people of the region. Members of the Panel should acknowledge the influence the Emirate has on various peoples in the region, how religion is used as a tool to galvanize to ignite violent actions against the Federation, and the foreign support it gets—mainly from other Islamist terrorist organizations. Thus, the first step this Panel should take is to acknowledge the existence of the Emirate and recognize it as an *intra*-territorial terrorist organization, ready to cause further encroachment on Russian Federation’s right to sovereignty and freedom, remembering that the United Nations—alongside Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the United Arab Emirates—recognized it as a terrorist organization. Members of the Panel should comprehend that Russian-imposed national curriculum to educate the public on the existence and the negative consequences of the Emirate would not prove effective, given that (a) the Chechen Republic (and other affected republics in the North Caucasus) is a federal subject and has the right to draft its own national curricula on various levels, (b) the supporters of the Emirate usually reside in mountainous regions of the Republic, where educational institutions are not located (thus not being able to provide any incentive whatsoever for individuals to participate in these educational programs), and (c) supporters of the Emirate are not usually within the appropriate age group. It would be accurate to claim that the Emirate is not as powerful as it previously was due to the efforts of the Russian Federation; however, the experts should also bear in mind that further military action is not the most feasible solution to dismantle the Emirate, given that its members are currently spread all over the Caucasus, and, thus, attempting to enforce a military operation would greatly endanger civilians in the area. Given the previous casualties oft-mentioned wars caused in the area, the experts would be doing a fair analysis to assume that such actions would result in the same number, if not more, of casualties. Attempting to locate the leader(s) of the Emirate and trying to neutralize them would also prove ineffective, given that such previous actions only resulted in an (extremely) brief confusion and disorder within the Emirate, where such neutralized leaders were replaced by like-minded tyrants, suggesting to conclude that such actions are only a waste of resources (and human capital). Having listed the possible ineffective (and unfeasible) solutions, this expert would suggest the Panel to pursue a strategy of tracing back the funds received by the Emirate and attempting to deprive the Emirate of the way they procure such funds, meaning that the Panel should discuss ways of enforcing this strategy in an international (*inter*-territorial) forum. Acknowledging the existence of other micro extremist terrorist groups in the North Caucasus, it would be accurate to note that most of these groups are acting as an extension of the Emirate; thus, depriving the Emirate from its financial support would also result in these micro terrorist organizations to be extremely weakened, perhaps to a point of non-existence. This expert, lastly, believes that it would be redundant (since it



has been discussed ad nauseum in many international platforms) and extremely unproductive to debate whether multiculturalism is possible and, if possible, to what extent. However, this expert does recognize that it is, indeed, possible to achieve an environment where diverse persons/peoples can coexist without vicious conflicts. Though eliminating the Emirate does not solve this issue entirely and does not permanently change the locals' minds on this issue, it would be a huge step forward and would perhaps mark a milestone in the avenue of establishing a multicultural peace. However, the experts of this Panel should also work to create a framework where the Federation sets red lines of political and social behavior of citizens, especially for the Dagestani region. The conflict in the South Caucasus mainly exists as two state-vs.-state conflicts, making it relatively easier to solve them compared to the conflict in the North Caucasus, given that there are more concrete steps that can be taken by the UN. Although the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is also a military one, diplomatic and democratic means to tackle the conflict should be prioritized. Creating an international platform would be essential to discuss ways where Armenian and Azerbaijani governments can find a common ground in front of the international community, whilst also hearing from Mr. Bako Sahakyan's *de facto* government. Though a ceasefire agreement between these two Member States exist, a more punitive one can be enforced by the UN Security Council to ensure that if a Member State violates the ceasefire, there will be sanctions against them. Military option, as in creating a UN buffer zone with the help of the UN Peacekeepers, can be used as a last resort if the armed conflict in the region is to enkindle. Foreign military intervention, by any means, should be refrained from, given that there already are ample Azerbaijani, Armenian, and Artsakh military personnel on the ground and that it would be a violation of Azerbaijan's sovereignty, given that the region is still officially recognized as Azerbaijani territory. Much could be said about resolving the conflict in South Ossetia, but one productive action was deemed appropriate by the Russian Federation: Recognizing South Ossetia as a sovereign state. Should the other Member States come to terms with the understanding that a democratic referendum—one that was repeated twice (because of Georgian speculation), one that was monitored by 34 international independent observers across the globe, one that had a 95% voter turnout, and one that showed that 99% of South Ossetian voters chose independence ("South")—must be deemed valid, the whole conflict will become nothing but a sheer moot. The Federation cannot offer any other resolution to the conflict at hand, since it simply requires the United Nations and its Member State to recognize the legitimate independence (and thus sovereignty) of the South Ossetian government. Same applies for the resolution of the conflict in the Republic of Abkhazia as well.

- B. The question of the Caspian Sea and surrounding territories:** It is, first and foremost, important to understand that the Federation does not claim, nor request, absolute territorial sovereignty over the Caspian, nor the natural resources gathered from the Caspian in general. However, this is not to



indicate that the Federation would be open to international exploitation of the Caspian under the name of enforcing international treaties and would see such actions as a violation of the “Caspian Five”’s national sovereignty. It is clear to the Federation that the Caspian should be seen as a lake, not a sea as its name indicates, because of its clear geographical features; thus, the Federation would suggest all Member States to come to terms with and accept this definition rather than trying to disregard the “Caspian Five”’s sovereign possession rights. The Federation, and this expert’s, aim is not to dominate and infringe upon other Member States’ rights to have access to the Caspian; however, they believe this process should ensue in a diplomatic and organized manner, where all five parties involved are granted the conditions they deserve and request in regards to finding common ground. The Federation sees the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea as an effective tool for the members of the “Caspian Five” to convene and discuss ways to reach a consensus on the allocation of the physical and natural resources of the Caspian. These conventions could convene more frequently to speed up the process. This expert understands that since the clauses this Panel passes are to be approved unanimously, it would be beneficial for the members of the “Caspian Five” to engage in quid-pro-quo deals with other Member States, whilst ensuring that these deals are not, by any means, the direct allocation or transfer of any resources of the Caspian. This expert cannot come with the exact terms of such deals, or what such deals would be to begin with, without consulting with other experts of the Panel but believes that it is something this Panel should tackle to pass unanimous clauses.

- C. The question of the shift of trade routes in Eurasia:** The main and sole problem with the New Silk Road Initiative introduced by President Xi Jinping is that it attempts to create a trade monopoly not only along the Eurasian region but also over the entire (and only) trade routes of many Member States in the region; thus, the only step that has to be taken to tackle this agenda item would be to ensure that every involved Member State is taking an equal amount of profit from this new route in regards to the contribution they provide and that the Initiative is not dominated by any specific Member State. This expert believes that a primary way to solve this issue would be to discuss how these trade routes are to be categorized under international law in regards to territorial sovereignty and how taxation of these routes would, ergo, work. This expert would suggest that the regional portions of such trade routes shall still be considered as part of the jurisdiction of the Member State it passes from (since they are still on their sovereign soil and that there is no legally binding international statute that dictates the opposite) and that they should still have the power to tax users of such routes according to their discretion. However, a new problem arises with this solution that the Panel has to tackle: the continuance of access to these routes. Though they will be under the sole jurisdiction of the Member State that has territorial authority, as a part of the joining process, Member States should also be signing a treaty that ensures that such routes cannot be arbitrarily



closed upon the sole discretion of one Member State and that if such (temporary) closures are necessary, they have to be approved by a newly-established independent council that would decide upon such an issue. The expert acknowledges that this is an unorthodox and unheard-of proposal but since the aim is trying to recreate a trade route similar to that used between 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC and the 18<sup>th</sup> century—when the concept of territorial integrity and the UN was absent—it requires revolutionary measures to tackle possible controversies that may arise. With the freedom to tax, a new problem may also arise in the sense that some Member States may tax users of their territorial route too heavily (or too lightly for that matter of fact) to somehow create a different conveyance of dominance (thus, political controversy). For this possible issue and the fact that many Member States would be depending highly on the Chinese government to fund the infrastructure and the development of such routes, a new international fund can be created to tackle this issue that will be monitored by an newly-established committee under the aforementioned Council. Member States can directly petition to use this fund; however, tracing the use of such funds are also important to eliminate any corruption that could occur in Member States' allocation processes. To eliminate the issue of unfair competitiveness in regards to taxation, Member States could be given the freedom to tax according to their discretion until the debt they got from the aforementioned fund is cleared, where, afterwards, they will permitted tax within a range that will be determined by the contributing Member States of the Initiative to ensure that there is no undue burden on any party. It is also important to note that although Member States will be sending different amounts of currency to the newly-established international fund in regards to what they deem appropriate, they will, in aggregate, be compensated for the funds they have provided and any other debts they have taken from the fund, whereas further profiting from the taxes they gather from users after clearing their debts. By implementing this series of processes, this Panel would be eliminating the possible (and extreme) Chinese financial dominance over other Member States. Since the joint comminqué that will pass this Panel has to approved unanimously, it would also be beneficial to be inclusive in terms of the Member States that join this Initiative, meaning that the Initiative should not be seen as a vigilante-esque power against the Western Member States (mostly the United States since they have raised concerns) but rather a true trade exchange amongst all Member States that will be beneficial to all and where no Member State feels left out.



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